A US sailor takes a photo of Jebel Musa on the African side of the Strait of Gibraltar from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman, December 4, 2018.
US Navy/Mass Comm. Specialist 3rd Class Joseph A.D. Phillips
The warming Arctic is becoming a growing area of operation for the Navy.
The need for more presence in the Arctic comes as the Navy also refocuses on countering China and Russia.
Rep. Elaine Luria, vice chair of the House Armed Services Committee, worries the Navy doesn’t have the right plan to meet those challenges.
As Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin reviews the US military’s footprint across the globe, one top lawmaker is questioning whether a new combatant commander is needed to meet growing threats from Russia and China in the increasingly accessible Arctic.
Three US combatant commands – Northern Command, European Command, and Indo-Pacific Command – converge in the Arctic. Each command has assigned forces, but those forces are very different.
Indo-Pacific Command has more than 100 naval vessels to operate around the Pacific Ocean, but US European Command has only a handful of guided-missile destroyers, which mostly focus on the Mediterranean. Northern Command has no assigned naval forces for its area of responsibility off the US coasts.
At two recent House Armed Services Committee hearings, Rep. Elaine Luria, a Virginia Beach Democrat and vice chair of the committee, pressed Air Force Gen. Glen VanHerck and Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters- leaders of Northern Command and European Command, respectively-about whether they have enough forces and the right operational structure to address the challenges in their regions.
Neither VanHerck nor Wolters said there were any problems, and Luria, a retired Navy commander, told Insider in an interview that she doesn’t see any lack of leadership.
However, the complexities of that huge geographic region and the competing interests there could require a new approach, such as assigning forces specifically to the Arctic.
“It happened over time that the map has shifted as far as where the combatant commanders’ geographic areas are,” Luria said. “Should there be a single combatant commander with forces assigned to the Arctic? It’s a question I was trying to kind of go after from the combatant commanders.”
Same forces, more demand
British navy frigate HMS Kent; US Navy guided-missile destroyers USS Roosevelt, USS Porter, USS Donald Cook; and supply ship USNS Supply in the Arctic Ocean, May 5, 2020.
The Unified Command Plan, which lays out the organizational structure for the combatant commands, was last updated a decade ago with regard to the Arctic, and that region is now “the ultimate unfunded mandate,” said Heather Conley, who directs the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, referring to military programs seen as needed but not included in its budget.
Those three combatant commands have their hands full – Northern Command with defense of the US, Indo-Pacific Command in the South China Sea, and European Command with its busy southern flank – Conley told Insider.
A subregional commander who can develop and advocate a coherent strategy for the Arctic is necessary, Conley said.
“You just don’t have anyone who wakes every day at a senior level thinking about the Arctic,” she said in an interview. “You have Congress … pushing the administration constantly, militarily, to think about this.”
That increased thinking is reflected in the Arctic-specific strategies released by the Pentagon and service branches – seven of them between 2019 and 2021 alone, Conley said.
“I’ve never seen such an amazing array of military strategies,” Conley told Insider.
Luria cautioned that great-power competition with Russia and China could increase the demand on the Navy around the globe, stretching it even thinner as it continues with other missions, such as the withdrawal from Afghanistan and efforts to counter Iran.
“As soon as we started to implement the withdrawal from Afghanistan, one of the very first questions that was asked was, ‘Where’s the aircraft carrier?'” Luria told Insider. “Like, we need an aircraft carrier to support this withdrawal. If we don’t have land forces in the region, is that going to create even more of a demand on naval forces?”
‘Raising the alarm flag’
A crane moves the lower stern into place on the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy at Huntington Ingalls Shipbuilding in Newport News, Virginia, June 22, 2017.
US Navy
The global posture review announced in February is meant to help reprioritize how the military uses its forces and resources.
Its results aren’t expected until later this year, but Luria said the Navy needs to lean on allies while boosting its own presence in the Pacific and gaining proficiency in the North Atlantic and Arctic.
“If you ask am I satisfied with what our presence is in any [area of responsibility], my answer is going to be ‘No,’ because I think we need to grow the Navy and we need more forces and we need to deploy forward more,” Luria said.
Growing the Navy will require building more ships at a faster pace – even as the service struggles to maintain the fleet it has.
Continuous maintenance delays and operational problems that have plagued the Littoral Combat Ship program, the Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyers, and the new Ford-class aircraft carriers – which has been the focus of Luria’s ire – only compound the Navy’s challenge.
“Each one of those failures falls on the backs of the sailors on the ships that are deployable, right? So we see these double deployments of carrier strike groups and other ships, you know, really lengthy deployments,” Luria said. “So we need to build more, we need to operate and maintain more efficiently, and we need to stop decommissioning ships faster than we can build them.”
Instead, Luria supports “modest investments” in research and development for new technologies alongside smaller investments in upgrading cruisers rather than scuttling them early, as the Navy wants to do.
While planning for the future is necessary, Luria said divesting ships now ignores immediate needs. The situation with China “really keeps me up at night,” she said.
“It’s not just the Navy, but as a country I think that we need to be focusing a lot more on that issue and the existential threat that we have from China,” Luria said, citing Beijing’s growing economic influence and the expansion of its military, particularly its navy.
Rather than settle for what it’s being given, the US Navy needs to make the case to Congress for what it needs to meet those threats, Luria told Insider.
“One of my biggest takeaways is I don’t feel like the Navy is sort of raising the alarm flag enough,” Luria said.
Hungarian special operations forces and Naval Special Warfare operators test Special Operations Craft-Riverine (SOC-R) capabilities in the Danube River in Budapest, May 5, 2021.
US Special Operations Command Europe/Spc. Therese Prats
During the first half of May, US and European special operators teamed up for an exercise across Eastern Europe.
The drills were meant to test how conventional and special-operations units would work together in a major conflict.
In early May, the US Special Operations Europe (SOCEUR) conducted its largest annual exercise in conjunction with a smaller one, training with special-operations units from several NATO member and partner countries.
Trojan Footprint 21 and Black Swan 21 are especially pertinent as tensions with Russia in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea are still simmering.
SOCEUR planned both exercises to happen at the same time to simulate a full-blown conflict with Russia ranging from the Baltic states and Scandinavia south to Ukraine and the Black Sea region.
Romanian, Ukrainian, and US Army Green Berets conduct close-quarters-battle training during Trojan Footprint 21 in Romania, May 6, 2021.
Romanian army/Capt. Roxana Davidovits
US Navy SEALs, Navy Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (SWCCs), Green Berets, and Air Commandos were joined in the exercise by special operators from Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Georgia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Spain, Ukraine, and the UK.
The realistic exercises took place in Romania and across Eastern Europe.
Besides testing the interoperability of different national special-operations units in skill-sets such as close-air support, close-quarters battler, and visit, board, search, and seizure, the two exercises, particularly Trojan Footprint, focused on how conventional and special-operations units would work together in a major conflict with Russia.
Integration between conventional and special-operations troops is essential in a near-peer conflict environment.
Navy SEALs vs. Russia
Naval special-operations forces from Croatia, Hungary, and the US conduct maritime training in the Adriatic Sea during the Black Swan 21, May 8, 2021.
Croatian Ministry of Defense
In a potential conflict with Russia, Naval Special Warfare units would be extremely valuable for several reasons.
Since the annexation of the peninsula, the Russian military has bolstered its presence in the region, making it a seemingly impenetrable fortress guarding Moscow’s southern flank both from land and air.
In addition to potent radar systems that can track surface vessels hundreds of miles out, Russia has deployed several batteries of the formidable S-400 anti-aircraft system – the same one that caused Turkey to be kicked out of the F-35 program – to Crimea.
Indeed, Moscow has turned the peninsula into a prime example of the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) concept, which aims to defeat US air and naval supremacy by threatening ships and aircraft with missiles and other weapons and thus preventing them from getting within range.
A US Air Force MC-130J during low-level flight training over the mountains of Albania, May 4, 2021.
US Air Force/Staff Sgt. Brandon Nelson
Crimea, however, would be an ideal environment for Naval Special Warfare operations.
SEAL Teams can conduct over-the-beach raids and ambushes, maritime and land special reconnaissance, and underwater special operations, such as placing sensors on the ocean or limpet mines on enemy vessels.
Russian radar installations and A2/AD batteries and command-and-control systems would be a logical target for SEAL platoons.
But SEALs aren’t the only Naval Special Warfare element that could play an important role in a potential conflict with Russia.
An unknown gem
Naval Special Operations Forces from Croatia, Hungary, and the US conduct maritime training in the Adriatic Sea during the Black Swan 21, May 7, 2021.
Croatian Ministry of Defense
Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen (SWCC) are one of the smallest special-operations in the US Special Operations Command.
With less than 1,000 commandos – out of about 70,000 special operators in the entire US military – Special Boat Teams specialize in maritime direct-action, special reconnaissance, and infiltration/exfiltration of other special-operations units.
“SWCCs are a perfect fit for a near-peer contingency. We’re such a small community people tend to underestimate our capabilities. But we bring so much to the table. We’re more than the ‘boat guys’ who transport SEALs on target. We can conduct operations unilaterally in both an open-sea and riverine environment,” an active-duty SWCC operator, who was granted anonymity to speak about the unit’s role, told Insider.
There are three Special Boat Teams, two focusing on blue-water, or ocean/sea, operations and one on brown-water, or riverine, operations.
Austrian, Croatian, Hungarian, Slovakian, Slovenian, and US special-operations forces during exercise Black Swan 21 in Szolnok, Hungary, May 12, 2021.
Hungarian Ministry of Defense
They operate several special-operations platforms, including the Combatant Craft Assault (CCA), Combatant Craft Medium (CCM), Combatant Craft Heavy (CCH), which are all geared toward littoral and open-sea operations, and the Special Operations Craft-Riverine (SOC-R), which is essentially a gun platform designed for riverine operations.
“But perhaps our greatest asset is our stealth and firepower. Done correctly, the enemy would never know we were there, or they would be too dead to care,” the SWCC operator added.
Besides clandestinely transporting SEALs to Russian installations in Crimea, SWCCs can be very effective in rivers with the SOC-R. Riverine operations offer some great advantages, namely, speed, firepower, and stealth.
During Black Swan 21, SWCCs honed their riverine skills on the Danube River, Europe’s second-largest, which flows from Germany to the Black Sea and passes through 10 countries.
US special-operations units do have some real-world experience on riverine environments and riverine operations.
Hungarian special-operations forces and Naval Special Warfare operators conduct infiltration and exfiltration training with Special Operations Craft-Riverine (SOC-R) in the Danube River during Black Swan, May 5, 2021.
US Army/Spc. Therese Prats
During counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Navy SEALs and Rangers sometimes used rivers to their advantage when the improvised explosive device (IED) threat made roads too dangerous.
In a number of operations, SWCCs transported a SEAL or Ranger ground force close to a target by river, where insurgents wouldn’t be waiting for them, to great success as the insurgents were caught unawares.
In the 2012 movie “Act of Valor,” which was sponsored by Naval Special Warfare Command and starred active-duty SEAL and SWCC operators, showcased the utility and advantages of riverine operations during a fictional hostage-rescue scenario.
In the movie, SWCCs clandestinely insert a SEAL squad that rescues the hostage from the terrorist base – located very conveniently right next to a river – and extracts them under fire.
Despite its fictional aspects, the movie shows how riverine special-operations capability can be used to strike very deep behind enemy lines, where an enemy wouldn’t expect it and thus would be less prepared.
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.
A key plot element of the 1997 James Bond film “Tomorrow Never Dies” involved media baron Elliot Carver (Jonathan Pryce) using a stealth ship to destroy a Royal Navy frigate to almost start World War III.
While it seems like extreme lengths to go to gain broadcasting rights in China, one part of the story wasn’t a work of fiction. The US Navy actually did build an experimental stealth ship that resembles the fictional super villain’s vessel.
However, while the fictional Sea Dolphin II was supposed to be massive – large enough that a Bond-style fight sequence could take place within the hull involving dozens of henchmen – the real world Sea Shadow (IX-529) was just 165 feet long and had a crew of just four.
Enter Sea Shadow
The wheelhouse of the Sea Shadow.
US Navy
Development of the real-world version began in 1978 when the Lockheed Martin “Skunk Works” sought to extend stealth capabilities to submarines, yet it wasn’t until 1993 that the low signature warship was made public.
The program drew inspiration from the F-117 stealth aircraft. According to Lockheed Martin, “The initial design consisted of a cigar-shaped hull that was shielded by an outer wall of flat, angular surfaces.”
It was found that those angular surfaces could actually bounce sonar signals away and also muffle the engine sounds and the internal noises of crewmen inside the vessel. The Skunk Works team subsequently ran numerous acoustical tests in special sound-measuring facilities and obtained dramatic improvements.
However, the Department of Defense (DoD) actually didn’t show interest in this type of investigation until Ben Rich, the head of the Skunk Works office, adapted the idea for use with surface ships.
Sea Shadow gets underway at dusk in San Francisco, March 18, 1999.
US Navy
That led to a Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) contract to apply stealth concepts and materials to surface vessels and to test the effects of seawater on radar-absorbing materials.
The Sea Shadow was developed in great secrecy – and while it may have been a “stealth ship” it wasn’t in fact invisible to the naked eye.
In fact, with its unique Small Waterplane Area Twin Hull (SWATH) design, which gave it a catamaran-type shape, it would be hard to miss. It was thus assembled out of sight within a submersible barge in Redwood City, California.
Unlike the fictional Sea Dolphin II, which was worthy of a Bond villain’s super weapon, the Sea Shadow wasn’t actually that large. But it also only required a crew of four that consisted of a commander, helmsman, navigator and engineer.
Testing issues
Sea Shadow prepares to moor alongside the Embarcadero waterfront park, in San Diego, California, October 2, 2004.
US Navy/PM2 Sheldon Archie
Its first trials in 1981 could be described as underwhelming. The ship’s wake was unexpectedly huge and thus detectable with sonar and from the air. The problem was discovered to be from the motor propellers, which had been installed backwards.
After addressing the issue, the project moved forward and the vessel was completed in 1984. It subsequently underwent night trials in 1985 and 1986, but the Sea Shadow never advanced beyond the testing phase.
Some of what was learned in the testing were applied to other naval technology include submarine periscopes, while the lessons learned also were applied to new Navy warships, notably the DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class.
Finally, in 1993, the public was given a view of the experimental stealth ship – and it likely inspired the Bond filmmakers. The US Navy offered Sea Shadow for sale in 2006, but apparently garnered little interest, not even from a would-be supervillain.
One issue with the sale was that the buyer couldn’t sail the ship and could only scrap it. Why it wasn’t offered to a museum or other institution isn’t clear, but likely it was an issue of the technology on board. Sea Shadow was finally sold for scrap in 2012 … or at least that is what a potential villain would have you believe.
Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers and websites. He regularly writes about military small arms, and is the author of several books on military headgear including “A Gallery of Military Headdress,” which is available on Amazon.com.
The Marine Corps took out a moving ship by firing a Navy missile at it from the back of an unmanned vehicle on land – a new weapon the service’s top general says will make “an adversary think twice.”
Commandant Gen. David Berger revealed new details about a groundbreaking test announced last month in which Marines in California used a deadly new system to take out a threat at sea.
Known as NMESIS, the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System can launch naval strike missiles from the back of a modified Joint Light Tactical Vehicle to destroy targets.
Berger said the Marines testing the system were able to sink a ship on the move near California. The Marine Corps’ top priority in the 2022 budget, he added, will be ground-based anti-ship missiles.
“A very successful test,” the commandant said Thursday during the annual McAleese defense conference. “… That’s conventional deterrence because that’s a capability that makes an adversary think twice.”
The Marine Corps is undergoing massive reform after two decades of ground warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan. Berger’s Force Design 2030 plans call for the service to ditch heavy legacy equipment, such as tanks, to prepare for lighter, naval-based missions. The plan is largely centered around threats Chinese forces pose to the US military.
The Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System can launch Naval Strike Missiles from a modified Joint Light Tactical Vehicle at land or sea targets.
US Navy
Emanuel “Manny” Pacheco, a spokesman for Marine Corps Systems Command, said the missile flew an attack path “that exceeded 90 nautical miles before impacting the target.”
He declined to provide details on additional tests, but said others have been successful.
“The Marine Corps is investing in technologies and capabilities to modernize the Corps and ensure we maintain our competitive edge,” Pacheco added.
Berger said Thursday that Marines will have to support the Navy not only with anti-surface missions to take out enemy ships, but submarines too. The Marine Corps will need to step up to help control straits and other maritime avenues the US and its partners and allies need open, he added.
“Littoral warfare is where you expect the Marine Corps to come on strong, and that’s where we’re headed,” he said.
Tanks and short-range towed artillery pieces aren’t a good fit for Marines to meet future threats. Instead, Berger said, they’ll need long-range fires and light amphibious warships.
“We are reorienting from a ground, sustained land-forces mode – which we’ve had to do for the nation for the past 20 years – into a naval expeditionary maritime mode,” he said.
The Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System has been tested successfully against a target at sea.
NMESIS combines two existing technologies – Naval Strike Missiles and modified Joint Light Tactical Vehicles – for a deadly new way to hit targets offshore.
Marines scored a direct hit in a first-ever live-fire test in which they launched a Navy missile from the back of an unmanned tactical vehicle to strike a surface target at sea.
The Marine Corps has combined two existing technologies to produce a deadly new way to hit targets offshore. Coined NMESIS, the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System can launch Naval Strike Missiles from the back of a modified Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, or JLTV, to destroy targets on land or at sea.
Raytheon Missiles and Defense, which makes the Naval Strike Missile, announced Wednesday that the Marine Corps used NMESIS to hit a target in the water from Point Mugu Sea Range in California. The missile can take out targets from more than 100 nautical miles away.
Commandant Gen. David Berger showed a photo of the test launch to lawmakers Thursday when discussing the need for funding for ground-based anti-ship missiles. He called the test the result of the “brilliance of a couple of young officers” and Oshkosh Defense, a Wisconsin-based company that makes the JLTV.
“The people at Oshkosh and these couple of majors thought, ‘We can do this,’ so they took the cab off the back and they put a missile in the back with a fire-control system,” Berger said. “Now, we can move this around on vessels or put it ashore and hold an adversary’s navy at risk … to ensure that the lines on the sea are kept open.
“This is the speed at which we have to move,” he added.
NMESIS can launch naval strike missiles from the back of a modified Joint Light Tactical Vehicle at targets on land or at sea.
US Navy
Getting funding for ground-based long-range precision fires out of the next budget will be crucial for the Marine Corps’ mission, Berger told lawmakers. He wrote in his 2019 planning guidance that the service had fallen “woefully behind” in the development of ground-based long-range precision fires.
“We must possess the ability to turn maritime spaces into barriers so we can attack an adversary’s sea lines of communication … while defending our own in support of the Fleet or Joint Force,” Berger wrote.
In 2021, the Marine Corps requested $125 million to buy nearly 50 Tomahawk missiles it could launch from land. Congress ultimately did not fund the move. Adm. Phil Davidson, the head of US Indo-Pacific Command, told lawmakers in March that the decision to slash those funds hurt the military’s ability to deter China.
The JLTV used in the test at Point Mugu is an unmanned version known as a ROGUE – or remotely operated ground unit for expeditionary – fires vehicle. The Naval Strike Missile fired from the back carries a 500-pound class warhead, according to Raytheon. The Navy uses the missile on littoral combat ships.
Combined, the missile and ROGUE fires vehicle form NMESIS, which is operated by artillery Marines, Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, the deputy commandant of Combat Development and Integration, told reporters this month.
Berger said using a modified JLTV and a proven strike missile gives commanders flexibility since they can fire the munition from a ship or ashore.
“It’s the same missile, so as needed, the commander can move the ordnance where it’s needed most,” he said. “… [It also] speeds up our ability to field it. It’s a proven missile. … This is not a new missile system – we know how it performs. So we’re riding on the backs of something that is already developed and putting it on a platform that we’re very confident in.”
The leaders of China and the United States certainly don’t seek a war with each another. Both the Biden administration and the regime of Chinese President Xi Jinping view economic renewal and growth as their principal objectives.
Both are aware that any conflict arising between them, even if restricted to Asia and conducted with non-nuclear weapons – no sure bet – would produce catastrophic regional damage and potentially bring the global economy to its knees. So, neither group has any intention of deliberately starting a war.
Each, however, is fully determined to prove its willingness to go to war if provoked and so is willing to play a game of military chicken in the waters (and air space) off China’s coast. In the process, each is making the outbreak of war, however unintended, increasingly likely.
History tells us that conflicts don’t always begin due to planning and intent. Some, of course, start that way, as was the case, for instance, with Hitler’s June 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union and Japan’s December 1941 attacks on the Dutch East Indies and Pearl Harbor. More commonly, though, countries have historically found themselves embroiled in wars they had hoped to avoid.
This was the case in June 1914, when the major European powers – Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire – all stumbled into World War I. Following an extremist act of terror (the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife Sophie by Serbian nationalists in Sarajevo), they mobilized their forces and issued ultimatums in the expectation that their rivals would back off.
None did. Instead, a continent-wide conflict erupted with catastrophic consequences.
US Navy officers aboard guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin monitor Chinese ships in the Philippine Sea, April 4, 2021.
US Navy/MCS3 Arthur Rosen
Sadly, we face the possibility of a very similar situation in the coming years. The three major military powers of the current era – China, the United States, and Russia – are all behaving eerily like their counterparts of that earlier era.
All three are deploying forces on the borders of their adversaries, or the key allies of those adversaries, and engaging in muscle-flexing and “show-of-force” operations intended to intimidate their opponent(s), while demonstrating a will to engage in combat if their interests are put at risk.
As in the pre-1914 period, such aggressive maneuvers involve a high degree of risk when it comes to causing an accidental or unintended clash that could result in full-scale combat or even, at worst, global warfare.
Provocative military maneuvers now occur nearly every day along Russia’s border with the NATO powers in Europe and in the waters off China’s eastern coastline. Much can be said about the dangers of escalation from such maneuvers in Europe, but let’s instead fix our attention on the situation around China, where the risk of an accidental or unintended clash has been steadily growing.
Bear in mind that, in contrast to Europe, where the borders between Russia and the NATO countries are reasonably well marked and all parties are careful to avoid trespassing, the boundaries between Chinese and US/allied territories in Asia are often highly contested.
China claims that its eastern boundary lies far out in the Pacific – far enough to encompass the independent island of Taiwan (which it considers a renegade province), the Spratly and Paracel Islands of the South China Sea (all claimed by China, but some also claimed by Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines), and the Diaoyu Islands (claimed by both China and Japan, which calls them the Senkaku Islands).
The United States has treaty obligations to Japan and the Philippines, as well as a legislative obligation to aid in Taiwan’s defense (thanks to the Taiwan Relations Act passed by Congress in 1979) and consecutive administrations have asserted that China’s extended boundary claims are illegitimate.
There exists, then, a vast area of contested territory, encompassing the East and South China Seas – places where US and Chinese warships and planes increasingly intermingle in challenging ways, while poised for combat.
Probing limits (and defying them)
US and Chinese officials had a tense first meeting in Anchorage, Alaska.
The leaders of the US and China are determined that their countries will defend what it defines as its strategic interests in such contested areas.
For Beijing, this means asserting its sovereignty over Taiwan, the Diaoyu Islands, and the islands of the South China Sea, as well as demonstrating an ability to take and defend such territories in the face of possible Japanese, Taiwanese, or US counterattacks.
For Washington, it means denying the legitimacy of China’s claims and ensuring that its leadership can’t realize them through military means.
Both sides recognize that such contradictory impulses are only likely to be resolved through armed conflict. Short of war, however, each seems intent on seeing how far it can provoke the other, diplomatically and militarily, without triggering a chain reaction ending in disaster.
On the diplomatic front, representatives of the two sides have been engaging in increasingly harsh verbal attacks.
These first began to escalate in the final years of the Trump administration when the president abandoned his supposed affection for Xi Jinping and began blocking access to US technology by major Chinese telecommunications firms like Huawei to go with the punishing tariffs he had already imposed on most of that country’s exports to the US His major final offensive against China would be led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who denounced that country’s leadership in scathing terms, while challenging its strategic interests in contested areas.
In a July 2020 statement on the South China Sea, for instance, Pompeo slammed China for its aggressive behavior there, pointing to Beijing’s repeated “bullying” of other claimants to islands in that sea.
Pompeo, however, went beyond mere insult. He ratcheted up the threat of conflict significantly, asserting that “America stands with our Southeast Asian allies and partners in protecting their sovereign rights to offshore resources, consistent with their rights and obligations under international law” – language clearly meant to justify the future use of force by American ships and planes assisting friendly states being “bullied” by China.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi with then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo before a meeting in Beijing.
Reuters
Pompeo also sought to provoke China on the issue of Taiwan. In one of his last acts in office, on January 9, he officially lifted restrictions in place for more than 40 years on US diplomatic engagement with the government of Taiwan. Back in 1979, when the Carter administration broke relations with Taipei and established ties with the mainland regime, it prohibited government officials from meeting with their counterparts in Taiwan, a practice maintained by every administration since then.
This was understood to be part of Washington’s commitment to a “One China” policy in which Taiwan was viewed as an inseparable part of China (though the nature of its future governance was to remain up for negotiation).
Reauthorizing high-level contacts between Washington and Taipei more than four decades later, Pompeo effectively shattered that commitment. In this way, he put Beijing on notice that Washington was prepared to countenance an official Taiwanese move toward independence – an act that would undoubtedly provoke a Chinese invasion effort (which, in turn, increased the likelihood that Washington and Beijing would find themselves on a war footing).
The Trump administration also took concrete actions on the military front, especially by increasing naval maneuvers in the South China Sea and in waters around Taiwan. The Chinese replied with their own strong words and expanded military activities. In response, for instance, to a trip to Taipei last September by Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Keith Krach, the highest-ranking State Department official to visit the island in 40 years, China launched several days of aggressive air and sea maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait.
According to Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Ren Guoqiang, those maneuvers were “a reasonable, necessary action aimed at the current situation in the Taiwan Strait protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Speaking of that island’s increasing diplomatic contact with the US, he added, “Those who play with fire will get burned.”
Today, with Trump and Pompeo out of office, the question arises: How will the Biden team approach such issues? To date, the answer is: much like the Trump administration.
In the first high-level encounter between US and Chinese officials in the Biden years, a meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, on March 18 and 19, newly installed Secretary of State Antony Blinken used his opening remarks to lambaste the Chinese, expressing “deep concerns” over China’s behavior in its mistreatment of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang Province, in Hong Kong, and in its increasingly aggressive approach to Taiwan. Such actions, he said, “threaten the rules-based order that maintains global stability.”
Blinken has uttered similar complaints in other settings, as have senior Biden appointees to the CIA and Department of Defense. Tellingly, in its first months in office, the Biden administration has given the green light to the same tempo of provocative military maneuvers in contested Asian waters as did the Trump administration in its last months.
‘Gunboat diplomacy’ today
US Navy guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain in the South China Sea, April 7, 2021.
US Navy
In the years leading up to World War I, it was common for major powers to deploy their naval forces in waters near their adversaries or near rebellious client states in that age of colonialism to suggest the likelihood of punishing military action if certain demands weren’t met.
The US used just such “gunboat diplomacy,” as it was then called, to control the Caribbean region, forcing Colombia, for example, to surrender the territory Washington sought to build a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Today, gunboat diplomacy is once again alive and well in the Pacific, with both China and the US engaging in such behavior.
China is now using its increasingly powerful navy and coast guard on a regular basis to intimidate other claimants to islands it insists are its own in the East and South China Seas – Japan in the case of the Senkakus; and Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the case of the Spratlys and Paracels.
In most instances, this means directing its naval and coast guard vessels to drive off the fishing boats of such countries from waters surrounding Chinese-claimed islands. In the case of Taiwan, China has used its ships and planes in a menacing fashion to suggest that any move toward declaring independence from the mainland will be met with a harsh military response.
For Washington in the Biden era, assertive military maneuvers in the East and South China Seas are a way of saying: no matter how far such waters may be from the US, Washington and the Pentagon are still not prepared to cede control of them to China.
This has been especially evident in the South China Sea, where the US Navy and Air Force regularly conduct provocative exercises and show-of-force operations intended to demonstrate America’s continuing ability to dominate the region – as in February, when dual carrier task forces were dispatched to the region.
Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning sailing between Okinawa and Miyakojima islands toward the Pacific Ocean, April 3, 2021.
Japanese Ministry of Defense
For several days, the USS Nimitz and the USS Theodore Roosevelt, along with their accompanying flotillas of cruisers and destroyers, conducted mock combat operations in the vicinity of islands claimed by China.
“Through operations like this, we ensure that we are tactically proficient to meet the challenge of maintaining peace and we are able to continue to show our partners and allies in the region that we are committed to promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific,” was the way Rear Adm. Doug Verissimo, commander of the Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, explained those distinctly belligerent actions.
The Navy has also stepped up its patrols of destroyers in the Taiwan Strait as a way of suggesting that any future Chinese move to invade Taiwan would be met with a powerful military response. Already, since President Biden’s inauguration, the Navy has conducted three such patrols: by the USS John S. McCain on February 4, the USS Curtis Wilbur on February 24, and the USS John Finn on March 10.
On each occasion, the Navy insisted that such missions were meant to demonstrate how the US military would “continue to fly, sail, and operate anywhere international law allows.”
Typically, when the US Navy conducts provocative maneuvers of this sort, the Chinese military – the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA – responds by sending out its own ships and planes to challenge the American vessels.
This occurs regularly in the South China Sea, whenever the Navy conducts what it calls “freedom of navigation operations,” or FONOPs, in waters near Chinese-claimed (and sometimes Chinese-built) islands, some of which have been converted into small military installations by the PLA.
In response, the Chinese often dispatch a ship or ships of its own to escort – to put the matter as politely as possible – the American vessel out of the area. These encounters have sometimes proven exceedingly dangerous, especially when the ships got close enough to pose a risk of collision.
A confrontation between the USS Decatur, left, and PRC Warship 170, right, in the South China Sea on September 30, 2018.
US Navy Photo
In September 2018, for example, a Chinese destroyer came within 135 feet of the guided-missile destroyer USS Decatur on just such a FONOP mission near Gavin Reef in the Spratly Islands, obliging the Decatur to alter course abruptly. Had it not done so, a collision might have occurred, lives could have been lost, and an incident provoked with unforeseeable consequences.
“You are on [a] dangerous course,” the Chinese ship reportedly radioed to the American vessel shortly before the encounter. “If you don’t change course, [you] will suffer consequences.”
What would have transpired had the captain of the Decatur not altered course? On that occasion, the world was lucky: The captain acted swiftly and avoided danger. But what about the next time, with tensions in the South China Sea and around Taiwan at a far higher pitch than in 2018?
Such luck might not hold and a collision, or the use of weaponry to avoid it, could trigger immediate military action on either side, followed by a potentially unpredictable escalating cycle of countermoves leading who knows where.
Under such circumstances, a war nobody wanted between the US and China could suddenly erupt essentially by happenstance – a war this planet simply can’t afford. Sadly, the combination of inflammatory rhetoric at a diplomatic level and a propensity for backing up such words with aggressive military actions in highly contested areas still seems to be at the top of the Sino-American agenda.
Chinese and American leaders are now playing a game of chicken that couldn’t be more dangerous for both countries and the planet. Isn’t it time for the new Biden administration and its Chinese opposite to grasp more clearly and deeply that their hostile behaviors and decisions could have unforeseeable and catastrophic consequences?
Strident language and provocative military maneuvers – even if only intended as political messaging – could precipitate a calamitous outcome, much in the way equivalent behavior in 1914 triggered the colossal tragedy of World War I.
A US Navy ship fired warning shots after three armed Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) fast-attack boats came “unnecessarily close” to it and another American ship in the Persian Gulf on Monday evening, 5th Fleet said Tuesday.
At around 8 pm on Monday, the IRGCN speed boats closed rapidly with the US Navy coastal patrol ship USS Firebolt and the US Coast Guard patrol boat USCGC Baranoff, which were conducting maritime security operations in international waters.
The American vessels issued warnings over the radio to the IRGCN boats, but there was no change in behavior. The US Navy ship then fired warning shots. The IRGCN fast-attack vessels moved away after the shots were fired.
The US Navy said in a statement that US forces maintained communication with the IRGCN vessels and “executed pre-planned responses to reduce the risk of miscalculation, avoid a collision, and to de-escalate the situation.”
The service said that the “IRGCN’s actions increased the risk of miscalculation and/or collision,” adding that while the US “is not an aggressor,” US forces are trained “to conduct efffective defensive measures when necessary.”
News of this latest incident follows reports of another incident earlier this month involving IRGCN vessels and two US Coast Guard ships.
The US Navy said that the Harth 55 “repeatedly crossed the bows of the US vessels at an unnecessarily close range,” at one point coming within 70 yards of the US ships.
One “unsafe and unprofessional” approach, as the Navy described it, was captured on video.
The Iranian vessels responded to bridge-to-bridge communications but did not alter their behavior. They harassed the US ships for around three hours before finally withdrawing.
That incident was the first time since April 15, 2020 that US forces had an unpleasant encounter with the IRGCN at sea.
The military makes a big deal out of when a rifle goes missing, not to mention when a nuke disappears.
In spite of the fact the program is designed to be “zero defect,” here are seven examples of doomsday devices wandering off (including a few where they never came back):
1. 1956: B-47 disappears with two nuclear capsules
A B-47.
US Air Force
The first story on the list is also one of the most mysterious since no signs of the wreckage, weapons, or crew have ever been found.
A B-47 Stratojet with two nuclear weapons took off from MacDill Air Force Base, Florida on March 10, 1956 headed to Morocco. It was scheduled for two midair refuelings but failed to appear for the second. An international search team found nothing. The US military eventually called off the search.
2. 1958: Damaged bomber jettisons nuke near Tybee Island, Georgia
The interceptor pilot ejected, and the bomber crew attempted to land with the bomb but failed. They jettisoned the bomb over the ocean before landing safely.
Since the plutonium pits were changed for lead pits used during training, the missing bomb has only a subcritical mass of uranium-235 and cannot cause a nuclear detonation.
3. 1961: Two nuclear bombs nearly turn North Carolina into a bay
A US Air Force B-52 bomber in 1957.
AP Photo
On January 24, 1961, a B-52 carrying two Mark 39 bombs, each 253 times as strong as the Little Boy bomb that dropped on Hiroshima, broke apart in a storm and dropped both of its bombs.
One survivor of the crash, the pilot, was able to alert the Air Force to the incident. The first bomb was found hanging by a parachute from a tree, standing with the nose of the weapon against the ground. It had gone through six of the seven necessary steps to detonate. Luckily, it’s safe/arm switch, known for failing, had stayed in the proper position and the bomb landed safely.
“You might now have a very large Bay of North Carolina if that thing had gone off,” Jack Revelle, who was in charge of locating and removing the weapons, said. The other bomb’s switch did move to the “Arm” position but, for reasons no one knows, it still failed to detonate, saving tens of thousands of lives.
4. 1965: Loss of Navy plane, pilot, and B43 nuclear bomb
A Navy A-4 Skyhawk was being moved aboard the USS Ticonderoga during a military exercise December 5, 1965 when it rolled off its elevator with a pilot and a B43 nuclear weapon loaded. The plane sank quickly into waters 16,000 feet deep.
The status of the weapon is still unknown. The pressures at that depth may be enough to detonate the weapon and the waters were so deep that it would’ve been hard to detect. If the weapon is still intact, it would be nearly impossible to find as very few vessels can make it down that far.
5. 1966: B-52 crashes into KC-135, four thermonuclear bombs are released over Spain
A US soldier looks through material found after a B-52 bomber collided with a tanker plane during aerial refueling, January 17, 1966.
AP Photo/National Archive Record Administration
On January 17, 1966 a B-52 was approaching a KC-135 for refueling when the bomber struck the tanker, igniting a fireball that killed the crew of the KC-135 and three men on the B-52.
The plane and its four B28 thermonuclear bombs fell near a small fishing village in Spain, Palomares. Three were recovered in the first 24 hours after the crash. One had landed safely while two had experienced detonations of their conventional explosives. The explosions ignited and scattered the plutonium in the missiles, contaminating two square kilometers.
The fourth bomb was sighted plunging into the ocean by a fisherman. Despite the eyewitness account, it took the Navy nearly 100 days to locate and retrieve the weapon.
6. 1968: B-52 crashes and a weapon is lost under the Arctic ice
Like the Palomares crash, the January 21 crash of a B-52 resulted in four B28 bombs being released. This time it was over Greenland and at least three of the bombs broke apart.
Investigators recovered most of these components before realizing they had found nothing of the fourth bomb. A blackened patch of ice was identified with parachute shroud lines frozen within it.
Recovery crew speculated that either the primary or secondary stage of the bomb began burning after the crash and melted the ice. The rest of the bomb then plunged through the Arctic water and sank. The weapon is still missing, presumed irrecoverable.
7. 1968: The sinking of the USS Scorpion
USS Scorpion.
US Navy
The USS Scorpion, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, was declared presumed lost on June 5, 1968. The loss was especially troubling for the Navy since the boat had been following a Russian research group just before its disappearance.
At the time it was lost, the Scorpion was carrying two Mark 45 antisubmarine torpedoes (ASTOR). The wreckage would not be found until October 1968. The USS Scorpion is still on the floor of the Atlantic under 3,000 meters of water and the cause of the sinking remains unknown. The torpedo room appears to be intact with the two nuclear torpedoes in position, but the Navy can’t tell for sure.
Recovery of the torpedoes would be extremely challenging, so the Navy monitors radiation levels in the area instead. So far, there has been no signs of leakage from torpedoes or the reactor.
As the world’s two biggest naval fleets engage in the Indo-Pacific region, China’s People’s Liberation Army can observe and learn from the United States Navy in adapting future tactical combined operations, according to defence analysts.
They said the operators of China’s Type 075 amphibious assault vessels could examine the US deployment of an amphibious-ready group (ARG) to the South China Sea, which was led by the USS Makin Island landing helicopter dock (LHD) and joined the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group on April 9 for exercises.
The USS Makin Island is a 40,000-tonne Wasp-class amphibious assault ship able to carry a detachment of Marine F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters. The LHD and two San Antonio-class landing platform dock (LPD) amphibious transport ships – the USS Somerset and USS San Diego – as well as several helicopter and assault craft units form the Makin Island ARG.
“The displacement size and functions of the Wasp-class LHD are similar to the PLA’s Type 075 LHD, while the San Antonio-class transport docks are similar to China’s Type 071 landing platform docks (LPD),” Hong Kong-based military commentator Song Zhongping said.
US Navy amphibious transport dock ship USS Somerset in the Bay of Bengal, April 7, 2021.
US Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Brendan Mullin
Beijing-based naval expert Li Jie said the PLA would learn from the experiences of its American counterpart in turning its LHD and LPD into mini-aircraft carrier strike groups, an effective cost-saving measure.
“The US has studied how to operate their ARG in a more feasible and efficient way,” Li said.
“For China, the key mission of their Type 075 and Type 071 will be defending the country’s territorial sovereignty in the East and South China seas, as well as overseas interests, meaning the ARG combination is a better option than aircraft carrier strike groups.”
Macau-based military observer Antony Wong Tong said deploying both LHDs and LPDs indicated the US Navy’s capacity for tactical manoeuvres and joint cooperation on the high seas.
“The combination of LHD and LPD is an integrated expeditionary strike group, which is worth the PLA learning from if they are going to better deploy their Type 075 and Type 071 amphibious warships,” Wong said.
The Yimeng Shan, a Chinese navy Type 071 amphibious transport dock ship.
REUTERS/Jason Lee
Beijing plans to own at least six aircraft carrier strike groups by 2035, but so far it just launched two. The third is expected to be completed later this year.
China has launched three Type 075 LHDs, which were designed to each carry up to 30 attack helicopters and armoured vehicles, and eight smaller Type 071 LPDs with the displacement of 25,000 tonnes.
The Type 075 is the world’s third largest amphibious assault vessel behind the USS Wasp and America classes. It is bigger than Japan’s Izumo class and France’s Mistral class.
However, Song said that in addition to the amphibious ships, the most powerful weapon of the Makin Island ARG were the F-35B squadrons and detachments of multi-role helicopters suited to different types of sea warfare missions.
“The most challenging problem of the PLA is a lack of new-generation fixed-wing carrier-based aircraft like the F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter jets,” Song said.
“The F-35B helps the USS Marines grab air supremacy in both ARG operations, making its function like that of the mini-carrier strike groups … that means the US Navy owns nearly 20 carrier strike groups around the world.”
A rendering of a Chinese Type 075 amphibious assault ship.
CCTV
To solve the current shortcomings, Song suggested the PLA install a catapult on the deck of the Type 075 LHD to upgrade the platform and allow it to operate the country’s carrier-based J-15 fighter jet.
The US Navy was reported to have tested the idea of smaller carriers, which would reduce the range, speed and capacity of its US$13 billion nuclear-powered supercarriers known as CVNs, but cost half as much or even less, Forbes reported in December.
The ARG operation could be seen as testing a mini-carrier option, an exercise China could learn from, Song and Li said.
The United States military has engaged in a form of “cognitive warfare” following the latest encounter between its warships and the Chinese navy.
Both countries have deployed aircraft carrier strike groups to the East and South China seas, led by the USS Theodore Roosevelt and the Liaoning, respectively.
On Sunday, the US released a photo that showed one of its guided-missile destroyers, the USS Mustin, shadowing the Liaoning group – a move that analysts said was designed to send a clear message to the Chinese.
The photo taken on Monday somewhere in the East China Sea showed the ship’s captain, Cmdr. Robert J Briggs, and his deputy, Cmdr. Richard D Slye, watching the Liaoning, which was just a few thousand metres away.
“In the photo, Cmdr. Briggs looks very relaxed with his feet up watching the Liaoning ship just a few thousand yards away, while his deputy is also sitting beside him, showing they take their PLA counterparts lightly,” said Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at Taiwan’s Naval Academy in Kaohsiung.
“This staged photograph is definitely ‘cognitive warfare’ to show the US doesn’t regard the PLA as an immediate threat.”
Zhou Chenming, a researcher with the Yuan Wang think tank, a Beijing-based military science and technology institute, said the photo indicated that the US warship kept a “very safe distance” while shadowing the Liaoning.
“Both sides understand that there is a big gap between the US and Chinese aircraft carrier strike groups,” Zhou said.
Cmdr. Robert J. Briggs and Cmdr. Richard D. Slye monitor Chinese ships aboard guided-missile destroyer USS Mustin, in the Philippine Sea, April 4, 2021.
US Navy/MCS3 Arthur Rosen
Andrei Chang, the editor-in-chief of the Canada-based Kanwa Defence Review, said the photo was a “warning to the PLA” that the US was thoroughly informed about the Liaoning strike group.
The Beijing-based South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative said the US military had increased the deployment of aircraft and warships to the East and South China seas.
It also said the USS Mustin had been sent to waters near the mouth of the Yangtze River on April 3, and since last Sunday has been following the Liaoning group through the East and South China Seas.
The Liaoning aircraft carrier group also includes the Nanchang, one of China’s most advanced Type 055 destroyers, two other destroyers, a frigate and a support ship.
The Japanese defence ministry is also reported to have sent the destroyer JS Suzutsuki and two patrol aircraft to monitor the strike group as it passed between Okinawa and Miyako Island on Sunday.
Meanwhile, US Defence Secretary Austin Lloyd had a phone conversation with his Philippine counterpart Delfin Lorenzana to reaffirm their shared commitment to their alliance after Chinese vessels massed at a disputed reef, according to the Pentagon.
China has described the presence of the 200 vessels near Whitsun Reef as “normal and legitimate” and said officials are maintaining close communications with the Philippines.
But the Philippines has described the vessels as a maritime militia and last week the broadcaster ABS-CBN claimed two Chinese vessels armed with missiles drove away the ship carrying its news crew near the island province of Palawan. The broadcaster said it was the first recorded instance of a military manoeuvre against a civilian boat.
Macau-based military observer Antony Wong Tong said the report indicated that the PLA had deployed Type 022 missile boats to Mischief Reef, one of the seven artificial islands Beijing has reclaimed in the disputed Spratly Islands, which are just 250km (155 miles) from Palawan.
“The massing of China’s maritime militia vessels at Whitsun Reef implies that Beijing may attempt to resume its land reclamation project in the Spratly Islands because of the geostrategic location of Whitsun Reef, which is located between Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef,” Wong said.
“China realised Mischief is too far away from the mainland and too isolated in the Spratlys, but land expansion based around Whitsun Reef will solve the problem.”
