How Green Berets prepared to carry ‘backpack nukes’ on top-secret one-way missions during the Cold War

Green Light HALO
A Green Light operator conducting a High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) jump with the MK54 SADM.

  • During the Cold War, military planners wanted nuclear weapons they could use without sparking an all-out nuclear war.
  • That led to the development of tactical nuclear weapons for use against military or military-related targets.
  • Teams of Army Green Berets were trained to carry those nukes to their targets, which they saw as a one-way mission.
  • Visit the Business section of Insider for more stories.

Throughout the Cold War, as the nuclear arms race became more frantic, a nuclear confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union remained a major concern.

With intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and air-dropped bombs, both countries had several options when it came to nuclear warfare.

But the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the closing days of World War II made clear the destructive capability of nuclear arms and the danger of a full-blown nuclear conflict.

As a result, US strategists sought ways to use nuclear weapons without triggering an all-out nuclear war.

The tactical nuclear option

Davy Crockett Bomb mini nuke nuclear
An M-388 Davy Crockett nuclear weapon mounted to a recoilless rifle at Aberdeen Proving Ground, March 1961.

In the 1950s, the US military came up with the tactical nuclear option, using weapons with a lower yield and range than their strategic counterparts.

These weapons would be used on the battlefield or against a military-related target to gain an operational advantage. For example, the Air Force could drop a tactical nuclear bomb on a Soviet division invading Poland to stop its advance without triggering a disproportionate response – such as a nuclear attack on New York City.

There were two types of tactical nuclear munitions: The Medium Atomic Demolition Munition (MADM) had a medium-yield payload and required several troops to carry it. The Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) had a low-yield payload but could be carried by one soldier.

The order to use tactical nuclear weapons would still have to come from both political and military authorities. SADMs were subject to the same command-and-control procedures as other tactical nuclear weapons and were meant to be used only if there were no other means of creating the desired effect.

Tactical nuclear weapons came in several forms, including artillery shells, gravity bombs, short-range missiles, and even landmines. But perhaps the most interesting iteration was the “backpack nuke,” which was to be carried by Army Special Forces operators.

Green Light Teams

Davy Crockett nuclear bomb
US officials with an M-388 Davy Crockett nuclear weapon. It used one of the smallest nuclear warheads ever developed by the US.

Specially trained Green Berets were assigned to Green Light Teams. Their purpose was to clandestinely deploy in NATO or Warsaw Pact countries and detonate their SADM in a conflict with the Soviets. The Pentagon later included North Korea and Iran on the target list.

Green Light teams’ main targets were tunnels, major bridges, mountain passes, dams, canals, ports, major railroad hubs, oil facilities, water-plant factories, and underground storage or operations facilities.

In other words, SADMs were intended to either slow down the enemy by destroying or significantly altering the landscape or to target the logistical, communications, and operations hubs that are vital to an army, especially during offensive operations.

Green Light teams primarily carried the MK-54 SADM. Nicknamed the “Monkey” or “Pig,” the device weighed almost 60 pounds and could fit in a large rucksack.

In each team, there was a chief operator who was primarily responsible for the activation of the SADM. He and other members of the team held the codes required to activate the bomb.

Like every Green Beret team, Green Light teams were trained in various insertion methods, including parachuting – both static-line and military free-fall – skiing, and combat diving.

Free-falling was probably the most realistic insertion method other than ground infiltration, but doing it with the device was tough.

During parachute insertions, the chief operator seldom got to jump with the device because it had a high probability of injury for the jumper, and the chief operator was key to mission success.

An operator would have to strap the SADM between his legs like a rucksack, but the device would work against him as he tried to stabilize in the air before deploying his parachute. Even in static-line parachuting, when the ripcord is hooked to the plane, there would still be issues.

Paratroopers will release their rucksacks or other heavy cargo attached to them via a line moments before landing to prevent injuries. But the SADM tended to get stuck between the jumper’s feet in the crucial seconds before landing, resulting in several sprained ankles and broken legs.

Everything even closely associated with Green Light teams was top secret, and the seriousness of the mission followed Green Light operators outside work. They were instructed to travel only on US airliners and never to fly above a communist country in case the plane had to make an emergency landing, which could lead to them being held by local authorities.

No one is coming for us

Army Special Forces Green Beret skiing
Soldiers of the 77th Special Forces Group are towed on skis during training at Camp Hale, Colorado, February 5, 1956.

A common thread among successive generations of Green Light teams was their distrust of leadership when it came to their specific mission.

“During training, the instructors had told us we had about 30 minutes to clear the blast radius of the device. We never really believed that,” a retired Special Forces operator who served on a Green Light team told Insider.

“In every other mission, teams would have an extraction plan. We didn’t. It was all up to us to get the hell out of dodge. But that’s not how the Army works. So that’s why we never really believed that we could get out alive in case we had to use one of those things. It was a one-way mission,” the retired Green Beret added.

There were Green Light teams forward-deployed in Europe – even in Berlin – always on standby to launch. Some Green Light teams even sought to forward deploy inside East Germany to be ready in case the Soviets unleashed their military on Western Europe.

Green Light teams also deployed to South Korea at different times and were on standby in case tensions with North Korea turned into war.

With the end of the Cold War, the Green Light teams were deactivated. They were never used in a real-world operation.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (National Service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate.

Read the original article on Business Insider

How a daring raid by Norwegian commandos kept the Nazis from building a nuclear bomb

Norway Nazi Germany World War II WWII
  • In late February 1943, nine commandos set out of daring raid against the Germans in the Norwegian wilderness.
  • Their mission, to destroy a plant producing heavy water, would fulfill one of the Allies’ most important goals: Prevent the Nazis from building an atomic bomb.
  • Visit the Business section of Insider for more stories.

At 8:00 p.m. on February 27, 1943, nine Norwegian commandos trained by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) left their hideout in the Norwegian wilderness and skied several miles to Norsk Hydro’s Vemork hydroelectric power plant.

All the men knew about their mission was the objective: Destroy Vemork’s “heavy water” production capabilities.

Each man carried a cyanide capsule to take if they were captured and wore a British Army uniform so if they were killed and their bodies found, the Germans might spare the local civilians from reprisal killings.

Their mission would be one of the most successful in special-operations history, and it contributed to one of the Allies’ most important goals in World War II: Preventing Nazi Germany from developing nuclear weapons.

The race for an atomic bomb

Nazi Germany nuclear bomb weapons lab
The German experimental nuclear pile at Haigerloch, southwest of Stuttgart, being dismantled in April 1945.

Within months of the discovery of nuclear fission on December 17, 1938, the military potential of nuclear power became clear, and the race for an atomic weapon was on.

In April 1939, Germany started its nuclear-bomb effort, known informally as the Uranverein, or “uranium club.” It included some of the best scientists in the field, including the men who discovered nuclear fission and Nobel Prize-winner Werner Heisenberg.

During their research for a nuclear reactor, the scientists discovered that deuterium oxide, known commonly as “heavy water” because it has a heavier molecular weight than regular water, performed well as a moderator, enabling control over the fission process.

There was only one place in the world capable of producing heavy water on an industrial scale: Norsk Hydro’s Vemork hydroelectric power plant in southern Norway. The plant’s main purpose was to produce ammonia for nitrogen fertilizer; heavy water was actually a byproduct.

In January 1940, German officials asked to buy all of Norsk Hydro’s heavy water stock and if it was possible to increase the plant’s monthly output 10-fold to meet German demand.

This caught the attention of the French, who were experimenting with nuclear physics themselves and pursuing heavy water. Worried about German intentions, agents from the Deuxième Bureau, France’s military-intelligence agency, secured all of Norsk Hydro’s heavy water for France on March 9.

It was only a temporary setback for the Nazis. Exactly a month later, Germany invaded Norway and occupied it by early June. Vemork, now under German control, was forced to increase heavy-water production.

Operations Grouse and Freshman

Vemork Tinn Norway nuclear lab
The Vemork hydroelectric power plant, February 24, 2011.

The Allies, unaware of the German nuclear program’s progress, were increasingly worried that Germany may be ahead in the race. Vemork’s heavy-water production was known to be important to the program, and that alone was a good enough reason to take action against it.

Working with the Norwegian Resistance, the SOE created a plan for two teams to be dropped into Norway.

The first, codenamed Operation Grouse, was made up of four SOE-trained Norwegian commandos who would parachute into Norway, conduct reconnaissance, and secure a landing zone for a 34-man team of British commandos, codenamed Operation Freshman, who would land in two gliders and then assault the plant and destroy the 18 electrolysis cells that made heavy water.

On October 18, 1942, Grouse was launched. The team spent the next few weeks trekking to Freshman’s designated landing site, reaching it on November 9. On November 19, Operation Freshman was launched.

But Freshman was a colossal failure. Mechanical difficulties and bad weather caused one of the bombers and the glider it was towing to crash, killing the flight crew and a number of commandos. The second glider’s cable snapped when the bomber towing it aborted the mission, causing it to crash as well.

Survivors from both gliders were found by the Germans and executed as per Hitler’s Commando Order. Forty-one men were lost, security at Vemork was increased, and the Grouse team was stranded and had to fend for itself.

Operation Gunnerside

Norway Nazi Germany Norwegian Heavy Water Sabotage
A reconstruction of the Operation Gunnerside team planting explosives to destroy electrolysis chambers in the Vemork heavy-water plant.

Vemork was still a priority target for the Allies, and a new plan, with a stealthier approach, was developed.

A team of six Norwegian commandos would be dropped into Norway to link up with members of the Grouse team. They would infiltrate the plant, destroy the heavy-water production room with explosives, and escape into the night.

Codenamed Operation Gunnerside, the team parachuted into Norway on February 16, 1943, and linked up with the Grouse team on February 22. On the night of February 27, nine members from both teams set out for Vemork, with one member remaining behind to communicate with the British.

Upon arrival on the outskirts of the plant, they saw that the bridge, the only direct way into the complex, was heavily guarded.

The team had to descend a 328-foot cliff, cross a frozen river, then climb an almost 500-foot cliff before arriving at a fenced railway gate that led into the rear of the complex. They got there at 11:45 p.m. but had to wait for the guards to change shift, eventually cutting their way through the fence after midnight.

Once inside, the team split into two groups. Five commandos took covering positions outside the barracks, bridge, and main gate, while the other four entered the plant. Inside, they encountered only a Norwegian employee, who didn’t resist or raise the alarm.

Explosives were set in the target room, which was in the basement. The team evacuated and waited for the explosion. Because the room was so far underground and the walls were so thick, there was hardly any noise when the bombs went off, allowing the whole team to escape before the Germans found out what had happened.


Joachim Ronneberg Norway Gunnerside
Joachim Ronneberg, leader of Operation Gunnerside, at a ceremony in his honor in London, April 25, 2013. Ronneberg died in 2018.

The operation was a resounding success. The commandos destroyed the electrolysis cells and over 500 kg of heavy water. They managed to escape without firing a single shot or taking any casualties.

The Germans repaired the damage by May, but subsequent Allied air raids prevented full-scale production. Eventually, the Germans ceased all production of heavy water and tried to move the remaining supply to Germany.

In a last act of sabotage, a Norwegian team led by one of the Gunnerside commandos sank the ferry transporting the remaining heavy water on February 20, 1944, although at the cost of 14 Norwegian civilians.

The operations helped foil Germany’s nuclear ambitions, and the Nazis never built an atomic bomb or a nuclear reactor. Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allies in early May 1945, two months before the US’s bigger and better-resourced Manhattan Project tested the first nuclear weapon on July 16, 1945.

Read the original article on Business Insider

Trump’s erratic presidency is the latest sign giving one person control of the nukes is ‘dangerous,’ experts say

Donald Trump military
U.S. President Donald Trump speaks to Air Force personnel during an event September 15, 2017 at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland.

  • A congresswoman and former defense secretary recently argued the US needs a “no first use” policy for nukes.
  • Trump’s presidency shows the risks of giving a president total control over the nuclear arsenal, they said.
  • Nuclear experts say the US should change the status quo, but military leaders disagree.
  • Visit the Business section of Insider for more stories.

Donald Trump is out of the White House and away from the nukes, but the volatility of his presidency has once again raised questions about whether any commander in chief should have sole and unchecked authority over the US nuclear arsenal.

In late January, just a few days after President Joe Biden took office, Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren and former Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote that “no president should have unilateral power to use nuclear weapons” in an op-ed published by USA Today.

The article pointed to the deadly Capitol riots Trump was impeached for inciting and noted that for two weeks after that incident, he maintained control of one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals.

When Trump, a twice impeached president, departed the White House on the morning of Biden’s inauguration, he was followed by a military aide carrying the “nuclear football.” Though his presidency was basically already over, Trump still had the authority to order a nuclear strike for a few more hours.

“Having the president have sole authority to order a nuclear strike is just outrageous, to have that power in one person’s hands. It does not matter who that one person is,” Jessica Sleight, a program director at Global Zero, an advocacy organization working toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, told Insider. “It is outdated, it’s unnecessary, and it’s dangerous.”

“People really paid attention to this issue under the former administration just because of how volatile it was, but to me, Trump was really just a highlighter for how broken the process itself is,” she said.

‘Worst case scenario’

An Air Force aide carries the 'nuclear football' out of the White House as he accompanies President Joe Biden
An Air Force aide carries the ‘nuclear football’ out of the White House as he accompanies President Joe Biden.

If a president decided to use nuclear weapons, the “nuclear football” would be opened, and the president would be presented with pre-approved strike options. The commander in chief may choose to consult with senior advisors and military leaders before proceeding, but that is not a requirement.

Using the “biscuit,” a coded card that the president carries on his person, he would identify himself to a military official in the National Military Command Center, who would then receive and transmit strike orders once it was clear the orders were coming from the president.

Within just a few minutes, nuclear weapons aboard strategic bombers or carried by land-based or submarine-launched missiles would be in the air. Officials in the chain of command can theoretically object or resign in protest, but it is ultimately the Pentagon’s job to carry out any legal order from the president.

The president’s unchecked power to start a nuclear war dates back to Harry Truman, the only president to ever permit the use of nuclear force against an adversary.

While this concept was informally established during the final weeks of World War II, it was not until the Korean War that Truman’s White House officially asserted that “only the President can authorize the use of the atom bomb.”

Amid Cold War tensions with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union, the need for an immediate nuclear response, one that could be executed in minutes to prevent an enemy from crippling the US nuclear arsenal with a surprise attack, became a priority.

That fear of a surprise attack gave birth to the “nuclear football,” which was created to ensure that the president could wage a nuclear war at any time, no matter where he was.

The Cold War ended more than thirty years ago, but many of the same concerns continue to drive US nuclear authority and posturing decisions today.

“The entire premise of ‘the football’ is that the president must be able to order the launch of hundreds of nuclear weapons in a few minutes in the event of a surprise attack by Russia,” Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons and non-proliferation expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, told Insider.

“The entire command and control system is warped to deal with this unlikely event,” he said.

“When it comes to war planning, the people in charge always envision the worst case scenario,” Stephen Schwartz, a non-resident senior fellow at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, told Insider. “That’s why our nuclear weapons are still kept on alert, and that’s why the president is still followed around by the football.”

‘Tremendous danger’

US President Donald Trump leaves the CIA headquarters after speaking to 300 people on January 21, 2017 in Langley, Virginia . Trump spoke with about 300 people in his first official visit with a government agency. In the background a military aid carries the 'football.'
Then-President Trump leaves the CIA headquarters. A military aide in the background carries the “nuclear football.”

Presidential control of the nuclear arsenal, which rests on the competencies and capabilities of one man, has not always gone off without a hitch.

During Gerald Ford’s presidency, the “nuclear football” was accidentally left aboard Air Force One. Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton are also said to have gotten separated from the aide carrying the briefcase at one point or another.

Jimmy Carter sent a suit out to the dry cleaner with his “biscuit” inside, a former military aide says Clinton lost his card, and the FBI took possession of Reagan’s card after agents took his clothes at the hospital following the attempt on his life.

None of these incidents “tremendously imperiled presidential command and control,” Schwartz told Insider, “but they do point out the fact that when you have one person in charge of all this, it does put a premium on everything working and nothing going wrong.”

More concerning are the times when serious questions have been raised about the president’s mental health.

Facing impeachment, a seemingly depressed Richard Nixon who was drinking heavily sparked fears among members of his own Cabinet and some in Congress that he might order a nuclear strike and kill millions. Some similar concerns were raised about Trump after the Capitol riots.

As Schwartz explained, the president is the only person in the nuclear chain of command that does not have to pass or be a part of the US military’s personnel reliability program. Presidents are given authority over the nuclear arsenal simply because they are the president.

The greatest concern, though, is that a president might make the wrong call in a tense situation with no one in a position to stop it.

There is a fear, Hans Kristensen, a nuclear expert with the Federation of American Scientists, told Insider, that a “president that was a little unhinged would reach for that ‘nuclear sword’ sooner than he really should.”

During the Cold War, there were a number of nuclear close calls on both sides that fortunately did not escalate, such as the 1979 North American Aerospace Defense Command computer glitch that suggested a Soviet nuclear strike was underway. The US readied its systems and weapons in response, and the world came dangerously close to nuclear war.

It was determined to be a false alarm before the president was called, but the big question remains, if it had reached the president, would he have made the right decision?

Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev wrote to Jimmy Carter in the aftermath, calling the incident “fraught with a tremendous danger.”

“The most urgent task is not to make the response capability better,” Kristensen said. “The most urgent task is to reduce the possibility of mistakes and wrong decisions.”

‘No need to panic and launch’

A White House military aide carries the nuclear "football" as he leaves the White House
A White House military aide carries the nuclear “football” as he leaves the White House.

Sen. Warren previously introduced legislation calling for a “no first use” nuclear posture that would have legally prohibited the president from using nuclear weapons first.

The senator’s recent op-ed took things a step further and threw support to a bill previously introduced by fellow Massachusetts Sen. Ed Markey and California Rep. Ted Lieu that said that the Congress should be involved in any decision to use nuclear weapons given the legislative branch’s constitutional authority to declare war.

Warren is expected to reintroduce her bill, an aide told Insider. It is unclear if the legislation will be changed to include the suggestions of her colleagues in Congress.

An alternative to having lawmakers in the decision-making loop is incorporating the secretary of defense and attorney general into any decision.

None of these proposed ideas have ever really gone anywhere, though. “It’s somewhat Groundhog Day with this discussion because we’ve been here so many times before,” Kristensen told Insider.

“At the end of the day,” he explained, “it has been always the outcome that they die because people say you don’t want to have a situation where you box in the presidential decision-making by making it dependent on someone else.”

There is also an argument that changing the nuclear status quo could weaken US deterrence against rival nuclear powers, but nuclear weapons experts say that does not make sense.

“If you can’t hit first, why would that weaken deterrence?” Kristensen asked.

Sleight argued that “the US has the non-nuclear capabilities to credibly deter a non-nuclear attack against the US and our allies, and US second strike nuclear capability is a credible deterrent against a nuclear attack.”

Making a similar case, Kristensen told Insider that “there’s nothing an adversary, even a Russian-sized adversary, can do that would knock out our ability to retaliate,” so “there is no need to panic and launch.”

Biden has not been vocal about presidential command authority, but he has spoken about “no first use,” which he discussed as vice president.

“Given our non-nuclear capabilities and the nature of today’s threats, it’s hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary,” he said in early 2017, expressing confidence that “we can deter-and defend ourselves and our Allies against-non-nuclear threats through other means.”

Biden has also said that the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be retaliating against a nuclear attack, meaning that nuclear weapons would not be used in response to conventional, chemical, biological, or cyber attacks.

US military leaders have repeatedly pushed back against this thinking, stressing that America’s longstanding position of strategic ambiguity about whether it would use nuclear weapons is preferred to any limitations.

“Anything that simplifies an enemy’s decision-making calculus would be a mistake, and that’s exactly what this would do,” Gen. John Hyten, then the head of US Strategic Command, told lawmakers in 2019.

Adm. Charles Richard, who currently heads STRATCOM, stated last year that his “best military advice would be to not adopt a ‘no first use’ policy.”

More recently, Richard told reporters that he would welcome an evaluation of the US nuclear weapons strategy by the new Biden administration, which is expected to conduct its own nuclear posture review.

“I recommend that based on the threat,” he said last month, explaining that the current situation “warrants another look at it to make sure that we still endorse our strategy and we have sufficient capability to execute that strategy.”

Read the original article on Business Insider

Pelosi says she talked to the top US general about stopping an ‘unhinged’ Trump from launching a nuclear strike

GettyImages nancy pelosi
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., speaks during her weekly news conference in Washington on Thursday, Jan. 7, 2021.

  • House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said on Friday that she spoke to the US’ top general about possible ways to prevent President Donald Trump from having access to nuclear codes and ordering a strike.
  • “I spoke to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley to discuss available precautions for preventing an unstable president from initiating military hostilities or accessing the launch codes and ordering a nuclear strike,” Pelosi said.
  • Pelosi also called Trump “unhinged.” The remarks come two days after his supporters breached the US Capitol.
  • Visit Business Insider’s homepage for more stories.

House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said on Friday that she discussed with the highest-ranking US general about possible ways to stop President Donald Trump from accessing the nuclear codes and launching a strike during his last days in office.

“This morning, I spoke to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley to discuss available precautions for preventing an unstable president from initiating military hostilities or accessing the launch codes and ordering a nuclear strike,” Pelosi said in a statement. 

“The situation of this unhinged President could not be more dangerous, and we must do everything that we can to protect the American people from his unbalanced assault on our country and our democracy,” she continued.

A spokesperson for Milley told CNN that “Speaker Pelosi initiated a call with the Chairman” and that he “answered her questions regarding the process of nuclear command authority.”

Trump, as commander-in-chief of the US armed forces, has broad powers to direct military operations without immediate oversight, as was seen with the drone strike that eliminated a top Iranian general last January and nearly ignited a war between the US and Iran.

The president also has unilateral control over the nuclear arsenal, which consists of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and absolute authority to order a nuclear strike.

Wherever he goes, the president is followed by a military aide carrying a briefcase known as the “president’s emergency satchel” or the “nuclear football” that contains the necessary communication tools, codes, and options for nuclear war. The president uses a card he carries on his person in coordination with the contents of the satchel to order a strike.

The president’s Cabinet and military leaders can refuse to obey the president’s order though. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten, for instance, said in 2017, when he was leading US Strategic Command, that he would resist an “illegal” nuclear strike order.

“If it’s illegal, guess what’s going to happen? I’m going to say, ‘Mr. President, that’s illegal,'” Hyten, then the top US nuclear commander, said at an international security forum.

The president can remove and replace military leaders who object to his order, but he would still have to successfully persuade the replacement that the order was lawful.

According to Pelosi, Milley gave her assurances that some safeguards are in place to prevent the illegal order of nuclear weapons, CNN reporter Manu Raju reported.

Trump’s former White House chief of staff, retired Marine Corps Gen. John Kelly, said Thursday that “no one around him anymore is going to break the law” in the final days of this administration. “He can give all the orders he wants,” Kelly added.

Pelosi’s conversation with Milley, the details of which are limited, comes two days after Trump’s supporters violently stormed the US Capitol, delaying efforts by Congress to certify the 2020 presidential election. 

Her statement adds to escalating efforts by Democrats and at least one Republican to limit Trump’s power during his remaining 12 days as president. Many have called for the invocation of the 25th Amendment, which would remove Trump from office, as well as impeachment.

In her statement, Pelosi reiterated calls for the 25th Amendment and warned that if Trump is not removed, Congress “will proceed with our action.”

“Nearly fifty years ago, after years of enabling their rogue President, Republicans in Congress finally told President Nixon that it was time to go,” Pelosi said. “Today, following the President’s dangerous and seditious acts, Republicans in Congress need to follow that example and call on Trump to depart his office – immediately.”

Neither Pelosi nor Milley’s office responded to Insider’s request for further explanation on the details of their conversation.

Read the original article on Business Insider